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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—THE CAGE A FETISH CAN BUILD:
PROPOSED LEGISLATIVE REFORM FOR CIVIL COMMITMENT PROCEDURES
IN SEXUALLY VIOLENT PREDATOR LAWS
Anne R. Izzi*
Currently over five thousand individuals are indefinitely confined in
the United States with little hope of release. The 1990s brought a wave
of sex offender policy reform, creating Sexually Violent Predator Acts
that allowed certain sex offenders to be detained after the completion
of a sentence. Legislatures reason that some offenders have mental
defects that cause them to lose the ability to control their violent
behaviors, and until that mental defect is resolved they pose too great
of a risk to live in the community. However, without precise
definitions of mental defects or effective treatment options, these
offenders are facing the probability of life-long commitment. Until
researchers discover sex offender treatment methods that can provide
them with a realistic chance of release, the government should limit
sex offender civil commitments to those persons who have serious
mental illnesses and not merely “mental abnormalities,” in addition to
specified offenses that further the goal of the statutes. Given that there
are extensive and effective safeguards in place for sex offenders living
in the community, confining these offenders is not always necessary
to protect the public. If the states narrowed the scope of who could be
adjudicated a sexually violent predator there would be fewer civil
commitments, and therefore a better balance between the state’s
interest in protecting the public and the offender’s interest in retaining
liberty.

INTRODUCTION
“The state’s interest in public safety must outweigh the individual’s
liberty interest in remaining free from involuntary commitment.” 1

In the state of Virginia, a fourteen-year-old boy and his twelve-yearold girlfriend had sex, an interaction which would later be the foundation
for the fourteen-year-old’s indefinite confinement by the state.2 After
* Candidate for J.D., Western New England University School of Law, 2017.
1. Jason A. Cantone, Rational Enough to Punish, but Too Irrational to Release: The
Integrity of Sex Offender Civil Commitment, 57 DRAKE L. REV. 693, 704 (2009).
2. Galen Baughman, Questionable Commitments, CATO UNBOUND (June 1, 2015),
http://www.cato-unbound.org/2015/06/01/galen-baughman/questionable-commitments
[https://perma.cc/FJ4Y-UMQY].
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serving four years in juvenile detention for the statutory crime, he was
released into the community as a registered sex offender subject to the
same conditions as every other offender with a similar offense.3 When
Virginia sent the boy back to jail for a technical violation of the sex
offender registry requirements, he was still paying the price for that initial
incident when he was fourteen.4 The repercussions were far from over. A
Virginia court declared this young man to be a “Sexually Violent
Predator” upon his release from state prison and indefinitely committed
him to a different state facility.5 The state of Virginia did not violate
double jeopardy protections because this detention was not considered to
be punishment.6 They were merely protecting the public from his
potential for offending based solely on his non-violent sexual interaction
at age fourteen.7 This boy may be, eventually, released from the civil
commitment facility, but he will never be released from the stigma of
being adjudicated a sexually violent predator.
Sexually violent predators are a class of criminals that repulse the
general public.8 Mass media takes this revulsion and amplifies it, pushing
public fear of sex offenders to the point where the delusion that an enraged
child molester is around every corner becomes a societal reality.9
Exceptional and gruesome crimes against children are presented by the
media as a global issue instead of the anomaly that they truly are.10 During

3. Id.
4. Id.; see Cecelia Klingele, Criminal Law: Rethinking the Use of Community
Supervision, 103 J. CRIM L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1015, 1047 (2013). A “technical violation” is a
violation of the rules set out in a community supervision order when an offender is being
monitored upon release. Id. These rules for probation can include abstaining from alcohol,
socializing with other felons, or abiding by a curfew. Id. at 1030 n.76. Technical violations are
a way in which released offenders return to prison absent the commission of a new crime. Id.
at 1047.
5. Id.
6. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 371 (1997).
7. Baughman, supra note 2.
8. Monica Davey & Abby Goodnough, Doubts Rise as States Hold Sex Offenders After
Prison, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 4, 2007), http://www nytimes.com/2007/03/04/us/04civil html?_r=0
[https://perma.cc/5J2B-DQGZ]. In 1994, Leroy Hendricks was the first man to be committed
under the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act. Id. He had only been released into the
community for two days before being forced back into the facility due to a community petition.
Id. The mother leading the petition to remove Hendricks from the community commented,
“[y]ou can tell me that he’s old, but as long as he can move his hands and his arms, he can hurt
another child.” Id.
9. ROGER N. LANCASTER, SEX PANIC: AND THE PUNITIVE STATE 26 (2011).
10. Id. at 25–26. Journalists use these notable and outrageous cases to sell their work
because society today craves constant stimulation. Id. In this “world where everyday
experience has been rendered increasingly full of simulations such as television shows, video
games, online worlds—virtual realities,” people are not interested in reading about everyday
occurrences; they need to be excited by the virtual. Id.
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the height of hysteria, a newspaper published a comment warning that
“[e]veryone should be treating their neighborhood as if a sex offender is
lurking there.”11 Sex offenders constitute a category of society that is
denigrated to such a degree that they can be, and are, constitutionally,
indefinitely confined. This indefinite confinement generally has the
practical consequence of becoming life imprisonment under the guise of
public necessity.12
Lawmakers have distorted this fictitious fear and codified it by way
of Sexually Violent Predator Acts (“SVPA”).13 Under these laws, sex
offenders are subject to life imprisonment masked as preventative
detention through civil commitment schemes.14 SVPAs consist of three
elements that must be proven in order to commit an offender: a prior sex
offense conviction, a mental abnormality, and a showing that this mental
abnormality causes the offender difficulty controlling his behavior.15 In
order to be released from a civil commitment facility, the offender must
present evidence that his condition has changed to the extent that he no
longer meets the qualifications of a sexually violent predator.16 These
laws use overly broad and discretionary legal elements, creating a nearly

11. Gene Warner, 2 Sex Offenders Say They Don’t Deserve Harsh Label, BUFFALO
NEWS, December 27, 1999, at 1B.
12. Cantone, supra note 1, at 727 (arguing civil commitment is merely a pretext for
indefinite detainment). While Minnesota has committed more than seven hundred individuals
in the past twenty-one years, it has only released four of those seven hundred. Brian Bakst,
Judge Orders Review of All Minnesota Sex Offenders in Civil Commitment, FOX 9 (Oct. 29,
2015 4:52 PM), http://www fox9.com/news/40851395-story [https://perma.cc/G22G-CLE2].
13. Throughout the states, these laws have different names for the Acts and terms for the
offender, but this Note will use “Sexually Violent Predator” to refer to all state Acts. See, e.g.,
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-3701(7) (2014) (“Sexually Violent Person”); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ch. 123A, § 1 (2015) (“Sexually Dangerous Person”); NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-1211 (2009)
(“Dangerous Sex Offenders”); N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-03.3-01 (2015) (“Sexually Dangerous
Individual”).
14. Melissa Hamilton, Adjudicating Sex Crimes as Mental Disease, 33 PACE L. REV.
536, 552 (2013).
15. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a03(a) (2013).
16. WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.090(4) (2014).
(b) A new trial proceeding under subsection (3) of this section may be ordered, or a
trial proceeding may be held, only when there is current evidence from a licensed
professional of one of the following and the evidence presents a change in condition
since the person’s last commitment trial proceeding:
(i) An identified physiological change to the person, such as paralysis, stroke, or
dementia, that renders the committed person unable to commit a sexually violent act
and this change is permanent; or
(ii) A change in the person’s mental condition brought about through positive
response to continuing participation in treatment which indicates that the person meets
the standard for conditional release to a less restrictive alternative or that the person
would be safe to be at large if unconditionally released from commitment.
Id.
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insurmountable hurdle when attempting to prove offenders no longer pose
a danger to the public.17 If there is no clear description of the mental
abnormality that initially placed the offender in a facility, then there also
will be a lack of clarity for what is necessary for release.18
Currently, twenty states have codified civil commitment programs,
with New York enacting a statute as recently as 2007.19 The purpose of
adjudicating a sex offender as a sexually violent predator is to protect the
public from extremely dangerous offenders—rather than from every sex
offender.20 In practice, however, these laws have a different effect. As a
result of statutes being overly vague in their mental abnormality and
offense requirements, states are committing sex offenders who do not pose
the extreme public danger the statutes were enacted to target.21 Under
these statutes, courts commit sex offenders for offenses that are not
necessarily violent and mental “abnormalities” that are not necessarily a
disease or societal danger.22 Legislatures intentionally write SVPAs in a
way that can be interpreted broadly in order to reach a greater number of
offenders, and judges possess overwhelming discretion in deciding
whether the offender satisfies the commitment requirements.23 The
17.
18.
19.

See infra Part I.B.
See infra Part IV.B.
Civil Commitment of Sexually Violent Predators, ASS’N FOR TREATMENT SEXUAL
ABUSERS,
http://www.atsa.com/civil-commitment-sexually-violent-predators
[https://perma.cc/V93C-B64A].
Arizona, California, Florida, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas,
Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North
Dakota, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin are states
that have enacted civil commitment laws. Id.
20. WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.010 (2014) (“A small but extremely dangerous group of
sexually violent predators exist who do not have a mental disease or defect that renders them
appropriate for involuntary treatment pursuant to the [general involuntary civil commitment
statute].”).
21. Id.
22. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC & STAT. MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS
686 (5th ed. 2013) [hereinafter DSM-5]. For example, some courts have relied on the existence
of a paraphilia when “a paraphilia by itself does not necessarily justify or require clinical [or
legal] intervention.” Id. See also Brown v. Watters, 599 F.3d 602, 606 (7th Cir. 2010). The
doctor who evaluated Mr. Brown and determined he had a mental abnormality, later “admitted
that the indicators used to reach a diagnosis of paraphilia NOS non-consent were not identified
in the DSM; instead, they were indicators Dr. Doren himself had identified to bridge the gap or
deficiency [that] . . . exist[s] in the DSM[].” Id. In spite of the doctor’s confession on crossexamination, the court held Mr. Brown met the requirements under Wisconsin’s SVPA. Id. at
617. “NOS” is an acronym for the “paraphilia not otherwise specified” category. Michael B.
First, DSM-5 and Paraphilic Disorders, 42 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 191, 198 (2014). This
term is used to diagnose people who display an atypical sexual focus that impairs functioning,
but who do not adhere to one of the enumerated paraphilic disorders. Id. The DSM-5 further
divided the NOS category in two and renamed them “other specified disorder” and “unspecified
disorder.” Id.
23. N.J. STAT. § 30:4-27.26(b) (2008). A predicate offense can include “any offense for
which the court makes a specific finding on the record that, based on the circumstances of the
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United States Supreme Court has repeatedly held that infringing on a
person’s liberty requires there be an overriding state interest necessitating
such action; and, although liberty is not an absolute right, it requires a high
standard to be taken away.24
The severity of loss of liberty implicated by civil commitment
dictates an evaluation of its appropriateness relative to the state’s valid
interest in protecting the public, which is the intended purpose of the
laws.25 This Note argues the current model of sex offender civil
commitment does not adequately balance the interest of a sex offender’s
liberty with the interest of the state in protecting the public. Too much
weight is being given to the state’s interest at the expense of sex offenders’
liberties. When the Supreme Court has been presented with the
opportunity to clarify the statutes as issues of constitutionality arise, it has
only reinforced the vague terminology.26
Additionally, this Note considers the issue of access to treatment that
could promote a material change in an offender’s mental condition.27
States may release an offender upon a showing that the offender’s mental
condition has changed, resulting in the offender no longer posing a danger
to the public.28 However, the Supreme Court ruled sex offenders do not
have any constitutional right to receive treatment while they are in
facilities.29 And even the facilities that do offer treatment are not
beneficial because, as of yet, researchers in the field have not found any
successful treatment options.30 Thus, offenders effectively receive a life
case, the person’s offense should be considered a sexually violent offense.” Id.
24. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 750–51 (1987) (The “right [to liberty] may,
in circumstances where the government’s interest is sufficiently weighty, be subordinated to the
greater needs of society.”). In Jacobson, the Court held the right to liberty is not always
absolute, even in civil settings. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 26 (1905) (“There are
manifold restraints to which every person is necessarily subject for the common good.”).
25. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a01(a) (2013).
Because the existing civil commitment procedures under [the general involuntary
civil commitment statute] are inadequate to address the special needs of sexually
violent predators and the risks they present to society, the legislature determines that
a separate involuntary civil commitment process for the potentially long-term control,
care and treatment of sexually violent predators is necessary.
Id.
26. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 359 (1997). The Hendricks Court reiterated its
position that it has “traditionally left to legislators the task of defining terms of a medical nature
that have legal significance” and it will not depart from that tradition. Id.
27. See infra Part II.
28. WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.090(4) (2014).
29. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 366 (1997). While admitting that treatment
would be preferable, the Court concluded that the Constitution does not prevent “a State from
civilly detaining those for whom no treatment is available, but who nevertheless pose a danger
to others.” Id.
30. David W. Nordsieck, How the Professional Judgment Standard Could Undermine
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sentence when they are civilly committed, without hope of “recovering”
from the “mental abnormality” that placed them there.
This Note will explain the issues sex offender civil commitment laws
create, both substantively and procedurally. Section I.A will discuss the
social atmosphere that gave rise to new laws aimed at sex offenders,
including the impact media coverage had on particular influential cases.
Section I.A.1 presents and describe specific child victim cases and the
legal reaction they provoked. Section I.B explains the common elements
and themes in SVPAs, including procedural aspects. This Section will
then take an in-depth look at the formulation of prerequisite offense
requirement and the mental abnormality requirement that are part of every
Sexually Violent Predator Act.
Section II will begin by explaining the constitutional rights
afforded—or not afforded—to offenders in this commitment scheme. The
Section will go on to discuss the treatment rights of those committed and
the difference in treatment as it relates to changing jurisdictions. The
Supreme Court holds that sex offenders in civil commitment settings have
no right to treatment. However, some jurisdictions have set a higher
standard for treatment and other programming requirements.
Nevertheless, the issue is not treatment standards, but rather the current
lack of any viable treatment methods in the field of sex offender
management.
Section III will address ways in which sex offenders not in
commitments are supervised and argue that those same methods would be
safe and effective for more serious offenders who are currently
committed. These community supervision structures include registration
and notification, residency restrictions, internet restrictions, and GPS
monitoring. Doing so would retain the state’s interest in protecting the
public as offenders would be subject to numerous restrictions while at the
same time respecting their right to liberty. While it is conceded that living
in the community, even under the most severe restrictions, would not
provide adequate protection from a minute percentage of offenders, there
is a large portion to whom these community restrictions would safely
apply.
Finally, Section IV will propose linguistic changes to SVPAs in order
to rectify the current problem of overly broad requirements, and if applied
correctly will reroute offenders who previously would have been
committed into community supervision settings. This Note proposes state
legislatures narrow the statutory focus with regard to who can be
adjudicated a sexually violent predator. This can be accomplished by

the Validity of Sexually Violent Predator Laws, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 1281, 1284 (2011).
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removing vague language and provisions that allow wide judicial
discretion. The “mental abnormality” language should be replaced with
specified mental diseases, and the predicate offenses replaced with
enumerated offenses. In this way, offenders’ liberties will be better
protected and the public also will remain protected.
I.

SEXUALLY VIOLENT PREDATOR ACTS

“Mere public intolerance or animosity cannot constitutionally justify
the deprivation of a person’s physical liberty.” 31

A.

Social Origins of Sexually Violent Predator Acts

Sex offenders are victims of a moral panic.32 A moral panic is a
“mass movement that emerges in response to a false, exaggerated, or illdefined moral threat to society and proposes to address this threat through
punitive measures.”33 Moral panics prey on the imagination because they
are “part real, part imagined,” conferring exaggerated characteristics onto
a real scapegoat.34 Periods of rapid social change provide a ripe
environment to twist a disturbing event into an extraordinary fear.
The media is to blame for fueling these intense fears because it calls
attention to the most extreme and rare cases, even more so with the rise of
the internet.35 The extraordinary sex offense cases make the news simply
because they are extraordinary, rather than “ordinary.” Further, state
legislatures are to blame for codifying the unrealistic fear there are sexual
predators around every corner into law as “panic [became] the prod and
rationale for lawmaking.”36 The notable kidnapping and molestation
cases described below exemplify the moral panic surrounding sex
offenders, as the public applies characteristics from few violent offenders
to the entire sex offender population.
1. The Crimes Against Children Cases
“Currently, no other population [than sex offenders are] more
despised, more vilified, more subject to media representation, and more
31. O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975).
32. LANCASTER, supra note 9, at 23.
33. Id. Some examples of moral panics include witch hunts, McCarthyism, and Nazism.
Id. at 23–24. Two key ingredients in each of these examples, and in the moral panic around sex
offenses, are an imaginary threat and a real group that is portrayed unrealistically. Id. at 24.
34. Id. at 25.
35. Id. at 26.
36. Id. at 78; see also Richard G. Wright, From Wetterling to Walsh: The Growth of
Federalization in Sex Offender Policy, 21 FED. SENT. R. 124, 126 (2008). “Offenders may even
stay on their state’s registry after they die . . . [a]pparently even in death, sex offenders are still
dangerous.” Id. at 125.
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likely to be denied basic human rights.”37 The taboo nature of sex
offenders’ crimes makes them an ideal target for moral panic.38 In the
1980s, there was a 486% increase in the incarceration rates for sex
offenders, both because of the rise in rape reporting specifically39 and
because of the sex panic generally.40 In the 1990s a number of highly
publicized cases where children were victims of sexual assaults and
murders spurred new laws,41 which were aimed at punishing perpetrators
who committed violent sex crimes against children.42
a.

Jacob Wetterling

In 1994 the federal government passed the Jacob Wetterling Crimes
Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act43
(“Wetterling Act”). The Wetterling Act became one of the first legal
symbols of the public outcry against sex offenders—the beginning of a
series of similar statutes aimed at disproportionately punishing sex crimes
and protecting children.44 The Act is named after Jacob Wetterling, an
eleven-year-old boy from Minnesota who was abducted while riding his
bike and whose body was not found until twenty-seven years later.45 The

37. Heather Ellis Cucolo & Michael L. Perlin, Preventing Sex-Offender Recidivism
Through Therapeutic Jurisprudence Approaches and Specialized Community Integration, 22
TEMP. POL. & C.R. L. REV. 1, 2 (2012).
38. LANCASTER, supra note 9, at 25.
39. Id. at 26.
40. Id.
41. H.R. REP. NO. 104-555, at 2 (1996). “[N]o type of crime has received more attention
in recent years than crimes against children involving sexual acts and violence. Several recent
tragic cases have focused public attention on this type of crime and resulted in public demand
that government take stronger action against those who commit these crimes.” Id. The Bill
aimed at amending the Wetterling Act to include Megan’s law expressed the government’s need
to respond to the public’s rising concern and fear about recent sex offenses. Id. In addition,
through this Bill the government acknowledges that the public outcry does have an influence on
the legislative process. Id.
42. LAURA J. ZILNEY & LISA ANNE ZILNEY, PERVERTS AND PREDATORS: THE MAKING
OF SEXUAL OFFENDING LAWS 83 (2009); see also Wright, supra note 36, at 124 n.4. The author
here provides a listing of child victims who were the faces behind the Adam Walsh Act
specifically and discusses the rise in sex offender legislation generally. Id.
43.
Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender
Registration Act (the “Wetterling Act” or “Megan’s Law”), PUB. L. NO. 104-145, 110 Stat.
1345 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 14071), repealed and replaced by Adam Walsh Child Protection
and Safety Act of 2006, PUB. L. NO. 109-248, 120 Stat. 587 (2006).
44. Corey Rayburn Yung, The Emerging War on Sex Offenders, 45 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 435, 450 (2010).
45. ZILNEY & ZILNEY, supra note 42, at 85; Erik Ortiz, Man Admits to Abducting, Killing
Jacob Wetterling, Missing Minnesota Boy in 1989, NBCNEWS (Sep. 7, 2016, 8:27 AM),
http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/man-admits-abducting-killing-jacob-wetterlingmissing-minnesota-boy-1989-n643506 [https://perma.cc/UX4R-Q5NB]. On September 6,
2016, Danny Heinrich confessed to abducting, molesting, and killing Jacob twenty-seven years
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Wetterling Act required every state to have a system of registration for sex
offenders, and, subsequently, was amended to also include community
notification laws.46 The registry included the offender’s address in order
for public officials to readily locate a registrant during the investigation of
future crimes committed in a registrant’s vicinity.47
b.

Megan Kanka

The Wetterling Act was amended in 1996 to include Megan’s Law,
which required states to make their sex offender registries available to the
public.48 The federal government believed “[w]here a state has
information through its registration system concerning a child molester or
other sexually violent criminal who poses a continuing danger to others,
the State should not withhold this information from persons who need it
for the security of themselves and their families.”49 After serving his
sentence for a prior offense against a child, Jesse Timmendquas raped and
murdered his child neighbor, Megan Kanka.50 Megan’s Law was a
reaction to Megan’s mother’s assertion that if she and the community were
made aware of the sex offender living next-door Megan’s murder would
not have happened.51 Megan’s Law was first enacted in New Jersey,52
where Megan’s murder occurred, and was quickly followed by other states
and the federal government,53 reflecting the growing nationwide frenzy to

earlier. Id.
46.
Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender
Registration Act (the “Wetterling Act” or “Megan’s Law”), PUB. L. NO. 104-145, 110 Stat.
1345 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 14071), repealed and replaced by Adam Walsh Child Protection
and Safety Act of 2006, PUB. L. NO. 109-248, 120 Stat. 587 (2006).
47. Id. When a sex or child crime occurs in a particular neighborhood or area, police
will use the registry to identify and question registrants who are currently living in that same
geographic area. Id. Local registered sex offenders automatically come under suspicion
because of their existence in the registry. See id.
48. Megan’s Law, PUB. L. NO. 104-145, 110 Stat. 1345 (1996) (amending 42 U.S.C. §
14071(d) (1994)) (“The designated State law enforcement agency . . . shall release relevant
information that is necessary to protect the public concerning a specific person required to
register under this section.”).
49. H.R. REP. NO. 104-555, at 5 (1996).
50. See generally State v. Timmendequas, 161 N.J. 515 (1999).
51. Megan’s Law § 14071(d); see also HUM. RTS. WATCH, NO EASY ANSWERS: SEX
OFFENDER LAWS IN THE US 48 (Sept. 2007), http://www hrw.org/sites/default/
files/reports/us0907webwcover.pdf [http://perma.cc/FT5P-GS4A].
52. N.J. STAT. §§ 2C:7-1–7-11 (2015). The New Jersey Legislature enacted this statute
because “[t]he danger of recidivism posed by sex offenders and offenders who commit other
predatory acts against children . . . require a system of registration that will permit law
enforcement officials to identify and alert the public when necessary for the public safety.” N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-1.
53. ZILNEY & ZILNEY, supra note 42, at 87.
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protect children from the imagined ubiquitous sexual predator.54 With this
enactment, the community could discover where sex offenders were
living, expanding the reach of previous registration laws that gave
exclusive access to law enforcement.55 The method of community
notification varies based on the offender’s level of dangerousness and
specific state regulations.56 Notification can be as simple as updating the
public sex offender website or as deliberate as law enforcement
distributing fliers door-to-door.57
c.

Amber Hagerman

The federal AMBER Alert System in place today was adopted from
Texas, where the system was first established to find missing children.58
Nine-year-old Amber Hagerman is the name behind the missing child
system that is currently used in every state.59 In addition to reflecting its
namesake, the AMBER alert system also stands for America’s Missing:
Broadcast Emergency Response because it broadcasts information about
abductions through a variety of mediums.60
d.

Jessica Lunsford

Following the abduction of Jessica Lunsford in 2005,61 over thirty
states established twenty-five-year mandatory minimums for offenders
who are convicted of sexually assaulting a child twelve years of age or

54. Id. There were concerns that the availability of the registry would further stigmatize
and punish sex offenders, but they were ultimately outweighed by the concern for public safety.
See H.R. REP. NO. 104-555, at 5 (1996).
55. H.R. REP. NO. 104-555, at 5 (1996).
56. LEILAH GILLIGAN, CTR. FOR SEX OFFENDER MGMT., FACT SHEET: WHAT YOU
NEED TO KNOW ABOUT SEX OFFENDERS 6 (2008), http://www.csom.org/
pubs/needtoknow_fs.pdf [https:// http://perma.cc/V2HW-FP3N].
57. Id. Community notification can also take the form of posting fliers in the
neighborhoods or holding community meetings to inform the neighbors when a sex offender
moves into the area. Id.
58. AMBER Alert: Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST.: OFF. JUST.
PROGRAMS, http://www.amberalert.gov/faqs htm [https://perma.cc/845K-4ET3].
59. Id.
60. Id. Amber alerts reach the public through the radio, television, text messages, and
highway signs. Id.
61. ZILNEY & ZILNEY, supra note 42, at 90. A neighboring registered sex offender, John
E. Couey, abducted the nine-year-old girl from Florida, and buried her in his backyard after
raping and murdering her. Id. John E. Couey received the death penalty. Id.
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younger.62 Florida was the originating state of the Jessica Lunsford Act,63
as it was the state where the crime occurred. Within only a few years,
however, the Jessica Lunsford Act became a nationwide punishment
against sex offenders.64 Additionally, the Act implements lifetime
electronic surveillance subsequent to the offenders’ release, a measure that
has also been adopted by a number of other states.65
e.

Adam Walsh

The Adam Walsh Act of 2006 is the most recent and most expansive
act stemming from crimes against children and was targeted specifically
at sex offenders.66 This Act was passed on the twenty-fifth anniversary of
the abduction and murder of Adam Walsh, who was kidnapped in Florida
in 1981 and whose body was found miles away from the abduction site
weeks later.67 This Federal Act established SORNA,68 a national registry
of sex offenders; mandatory minimums for certain crimes involving
minors; a tiered classification system for sex offenders; and voluntary civil
commitment procedures for states, among other provisions.69 The Adam
Walsh Act changed the face of sex offender control by eliminating
interstate confusion and establishing a strict, comprehensive system of
managing sex offenders in the community.70
2. The “Stranger Danger” Misconception
Unfortunately these laws were mostly aimed at sex offenders who
were strangers to their victims, implying strangers as the ones whom

62. S. 6389, 59th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2006). Washington passed a Bill that went
into effect in 2006 in response to Florida’s Jessica Lunsford Act. The Bill’s amendments
included that “an offender convicted of the crime of rape of a child in the first degree or child
molestation in the first degree shall be sentenced to a minimum term of total confinement not
less than twenty-five years.” Id. In 2006, Kansas enacted mandatory minimums of twenty-five
years for sex offenses involving children and set provisions for electronic monitoring. H.R.
2576, 81st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2006). Although Jessica Lunsford’s name was not specifically
used in the Bill, the similarities in content are evidence that the recent Florida Act propagated
the Kansas Act. Id.
63. FLA. STAT. § 948.30 (2015).
64. ZILNEY & ZILNEY, supra note 42, at 90.
65. Id.
66. Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, PUB. L. NO. 109-248, 120
Stat. 587 (codified in scattered sections of 18 and 42 U.S.C.).
67. Id.
68. See infra Part III.A.1.
69. Adam Walsh Act § 111(1)-(4).
70.
See SORNA, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS: SMART, http://
www.smart.gov/sorna.htm [https://perma.cc/3MRK-AJY8].
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children need to be protected from.71 This, however, is false, as roughly
seventy-percent of child victims are abused by a someone known to
them.72 Stranger danger stories are more widely publicized because they
are more sensational, thereby catching the reader’s attention.73
Unsurprisingly, since these laws have the wrong focus—a stranger as the
perpetrator instead of a family member—they are not as effective as they
could be in decreasing sexual crimes.74
For example, the Wetterling Act has language that specifically
defines a “predator” as a stranger.75 Incest offenders are specifically
excluded from the Adam Walsh Act,76 which has drawn criticism, since
stranger offenders are the only offenders applicable to the statute and they
constitute the smallest percentage of offenders.77 The public will continue
to hold incorrect beliefs about sex offenders as long as legislatures create
laws based on exaggerated public fear rather than reality. The acts sex

71. Wetterling Act, 42 U.S.C. § 14071(a)(3)(E) (1994). The Wetterling Act specifically
defines predatory act as “an act directed at a stranger, or a person with whom a relationship has
been established or promoted for the primary purpose of victimization.” Id.
72. MYTHS & FACTS ABOUT SEX OFFENDERS, CENT. FOR SEX OFFENDER MGMT. 1
(Aug. 2000), http://www.csom.org/pubs/mythsfacts html [https://perma.cc/V2HW-FP3N].
“Approximately 60% of boys and 80% of girls who are sexually victimized are abused by
someone known to the child or the child’s family.” Id. The perpetrators are more often than
not people who the child knows as being in authoritative roles, such as older relatives or
caretakers. Id.
73.
JENNY KITZINGER, FRAMING ABUSE: MEDIA INFLUENCE AND PUBLIC
UNDERSTANDINGS OF SEXUAL VIOLENCE AGAINST CHILDREN 128 (2004).
74. ZILNEY & ZILNEY, supra note 42, at 84. “[T]he public has overwhelmingly
supported laws that do not work to protect women and children from the types of sexual offenses
by which they are most likely to be victimized.” Id. Interestingly, one of the developments that
does not characterize strangers as the target perpetrators has a high efficacy rate: the AMBER
alert system. NAT’L CENT. FOR MISSING & EXPLOITED CHILDREN, ANALYSIS OF AMBER
ALERT CASES IN 2011 128 (2012). “Of the 158 AMBER Alerts issued from January 1, 2011,
to December 31, 2011, 144 cases resulted in a recovery, 28 of which were successfully
recovered as a direct result of those respective AMBER Alerts being issued.” Id. at 8.
75. Wetterling Act, 42 U.S.C. § 14071(a)(3)(E)(1996). This Act is “directed at a
stranger, or a person with whom a relationship has been established or promoted for the primary
purpose of victimization.” Id.
76. ZILNEY & ZILNEY, supra note 42, at 92. Including incest offenders on the registry
could have adverse effects on the victim. Id. For example, if a man is included in the registry
and the offense listed is an incest offense, then the community will know that a family member
is the victim. Victims’ information is not part of the community notification laws and needs to
be protected by law enforcement. Id.
77. Id. at 92. “[A]s of 2004, only 18 percent of tier 2 and 3 offenders in New Jersey who
were eligible for inclusion in the online database were actually included because of appeals and
exemptions.” Id. The Adam Walsh Act establishes an in-depth categorization of the tier system,
but essentially sex offenders in the registry are ranked according to their level of dangerousness
and categorized as tier 1, tier 2, or tier 3, with tier 3 being the most dangerous. Adam Walsh
Act, 42 U.S.C. §16901 (2006). This 18 percent statistic is important because it shows that the
laws are not able to be as effective as they were designed to be because they are not being based
on the realities of sex offenses, namely that strangers are not likely to be the perpetrators.
ZILNEY & ZILNEY, supra note 42, at 92.
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offenders commit already stigmatize them; however, the current “war” on
sex offenders intensifies and prolongs the already existent stigma.78
When the average person hears the label sex offender, he or she
imagines those offenders who are on one extreme of the spectrum, usually
those who commit violent sex crimes against children.79 However, “[t]he
typical registered sex offender is a less freakish figure than the official
narrative suggests.”80 Child molesters make up a very small percentage
of sex offenders, and yet that small population is the connotation for the
term “sex offender” in the mind of society.
B.

Creating Sexually Violent Predator Acts

The purpose behind creating Sexually Violent Predator Acts (
“SVPAs”) was to prevent newly released sex offenders from committing
the same crimes for which they were imprisoned in the first place.81 The
inherent assumption in that purpose is that sex offenders have a high risk
of recidivism, which is not true.82 A study by the Department of Justice
found that only 5.3% of released sex offenders were arrested again for
another sex crime within the next three years.83 Another study by Human
Rights Watch found that only a very small percentage of registered sex
offenders ever committed a second offense.84 Furthermore, there are no
reliable tests for determining the likelihood of recidivism. 85

78. Yung, supra note 44, at 447. There has also been termed a “war on sex offenders,”
likening the stark increase in sex offense laws and their publicity to a criminal war, playing off
of the moral panic that they promote. Id. Criminal wars are typified by three stages:
“marshalling of resources, myth creation, and exception making.” Id. at 440. Examples of
criminal wars include the “War on Drugs,” the “War on Terror,” and the “War on Poverty.” Id.
79. John Douard, Sex Offender as Scapegoat: The Monstrous Other Within, 53 N.Y.L.
SCH. L. REV. 31, 40 (2008). When a Florida school district sent home a letter with their students
informing parents that a known sexual predator moved into the area, one parent stated that “I
don’t know the circumstances of this gentleman . . . but I took advantage of this to review some
‘Stranger Danger’ tips with my kids.” Jose Lambiet, Parents Warned About Sexual Predators,
SUNSENTINEL
(Feb.
10,
1997),
http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/1997-0210/news/9702090255_1_sexual-predator-middle-school-girls-letters [https://perma.cc/P8MG5VB3] (one example of the public making assumptions without the relevant information).
80. Douard, supra note 79; LANCASTER, supra note 9, at 79.
81. Melissa Wangenheim, Note, ‘To Catch a Predator,’ Are We Casting Our Nets Too
Far?: Constitutional Concerns Regarding the Civil Commitment of Sex Offenders, 62 RUTGERS
L. REV. 559, 572 (2010).
82. LANCASTER, supra note 9, at 78.
83. Id. (citing Patrick A. Langan, Erica L. Schmitt & Matthew R. Durose, Recidivism of
Sex Offenders Released from Prison in 1994, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., BUREAU OF JUST. STAT. 1
(2003), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/rsorp94.pdf [https://perma.cc/X3F7-UVH7]).
84. NO EASY ANSWERS, supra note 51, at 48. 98% of 500 sample registrants on the
North Carolina sex offender registry had only committed that original offense. Id.
85. Fredrick E. Vars, Rethinking the Indefinite Detention of Sex Offenders, 44 CONN. L.
REV. 161, 193 (2011). The variation in sex offense characteristics and motivations causes
uncertainty in assessing the level of risk for a particular offender. Risk Assessment, ASS’N FOR
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SVPAs resolved the public fear of sex offenders living unrestrained
in society. Under these acts, the state and federal governments are
authorized to imprison sex offenders who meet certain criteria either in
place of or subsequent to serving their prison sentence.86 Prosecutors must
show an offender qualifies with a specified prerequisite offense and a
mental disorder that makes him more likely to reoffend.87 Although these
Acts have withstood constitutional challenges,88 they present a host of
constitutional concerns, including ex post facto, double jeopardy, and
indeterminate detention.89
The state of Washington enacted the first SVPA in 199090 in response
to Earl Shriner’s rape and mutilation of a seven-year-old boy after Shriner
was released from prison for kidnapping and raping two teenage girls.91
In order to be civilly committed, Washington’s SVPA requires a
prosecutor to prove that an offender is a “sexually violent predator,”
defined as someone who has been “convicted of or charged with a crime
of sexual violence and who suffers from a mental abnormality or
personality disorder which makes him likely to engage in predatory acts
of sexual violence if not confined in a secure facility.”92 To reiterate, a
prosecutor needs to prove that the offender has: “(1) a prior conviction for
a sexually violent offense; and, (2) a mental disorder or disability (3)
causing the individual significant difficulty in controlling recidivist
behavior.”93 Other states quickly followed Washington’s lead by enacting
their own laws that were similar in nature, which also require a finding of
those three elements.94
In 2006, the federal government began enacting sexually violent
predator laws, an authority that, until then, was left to individual states.95
Now, offenders in federal custody could be subject to civil commitment.96
TREATMENT
OF
SEXUAL
ABUSERS,
http://www.atsa.com/risk-assessment
[https://perma.cc/V93C-B64A].
86. Wangenheim, supra note 81, at 560.
87. Hamilton, supra note 14. The specific statutes for commitment vary between
jurisdictions. Id.
88. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 366 (1997).
89. See infra Part II.B. Id. at 351; Hamilton, supra note 14 (“Those who are committed
are rarely ever released.”).
90. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 71.09.10–71.09.902 (2014).
91. John M. Fabian, Kansas v. Hendricks, Crane and Beyond: “Mental Abnormality,”
and “Sexual Dangerousness”: Volitional vs. Emotional Abnormality and the Debate Between
Community Safety and Civil Liberties, 29 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1367, 1373–74 n.25 (2003)
[hereinafter Fabien, Kansas v. Hendricks, Crane and Beyond].
92. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.020(18) (2014).
93. Hamilton, supra note 14.
94. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-3701–3717 (2014); D.C. CODE §§ 22-3803–
3811 (2001); IOWA CODE §§ 229A.1–229.A.16 (2014); MINN. STAT. § 253B.185 (2014).
95. 18 U.S.C. § 4248(d) (2006).
96. Id.
THE
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Not only did this enactment make it possible to include more offenders
because of the additional federal offenders, but also the definitions for
who qualified as a sexually violent predator were expanded.97 In order to
commit an individual under the federal act, the government only needs to
prove by clear and convincing evidence that the individual committed a
“sexually violent offense or child molestation.”98 Notably absent from the
requirements is a prerequisite criminal conviction under a reasonable
doubt standard. Now, offenders can be classified as a sexually dangerous
person without committing a sex offense at all, violent or nonviolent, even
though targeting violent offenses was the original goal of SVPAs.99 In
fact, approximately 20% of federally committed individuals were only
committed with a finding of clear and convincing evidence of a sex
offense.100 Sex offender legislation is becoming more encompassing at
every stage of development and the consequence is that more and more
offenders are at risk of civil commitment.
The Sexually Violent Predator requirements are broad because the
state and federal legislatures’ goals were to keep sex offenders off the
street and away from the community. After an offender has been
identified as a potential violent predator based on a prerequisite offense,
the offender is evaluated by a mental health professional and given a
hearing at which the prosecutor must prove the offender meets the
qualifications to be committed under the respective sexually violent
predator statutes.101
1. Prerequisite Offense Requirement
Committing a prerequisite offense is the first step in being considered
for commitment under a SVPA, although determining which offenses
meet the requirement is not always clear. Since each state’s SVPA
contains slight variations from each other, the offenses needed to satisfy
the first element are also slightly different and involve varying degrees of
judicial discretion. A few states specifically enumerate which offenses
qualify without much ambiguity, these states involve the least amount of
judicial discretion.102 Vagueness is introduced, however, in the final
97. Wangenheim, supra note 81, at 575.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Tamara Rice Lave, Throwing Away the Key: Has the Adam Walsh Act Lowered the
Threshold for Sexually Violent Predator Commitments Too Far?, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 391,
408–09 (2011).
101. See KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-29a03–29a07 (2013).
102. MO. REV. STAT. § 632.480(4) (2010 & Supp. 2014). “Sexually violent offense” is
defined as:
Felonies of rape in the first degree, forcible rape, rape, statutory rape in the first
degree, sodomy in the first degree, forcible sodomy, sodomy, statutory sodomy in the
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provision, which allows for the inclusion of offenses that bear similarities
to the enumerated offenses.103 Judicial discretion is needed, therefore, to
interpret the description “any felony offense that contains elements
substantially similar to the offenses listed above” is interpreted.104
Next are the states that use a more discretionary construction in
defining which offenses qualify as a predicate offense.105 The relevant
portion of the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act adds ”any offense
which either at the time of sentencing for the offense or subsequently
during civil commitment proceedings pursuant to this act, has been
determined beyond a reasonable doubt to have been sexually motivated”
after its list of particular offenses.106
Finally, New Jersey and South Carolina sit on the extreme end of the
discretionary spectrum, conferring to the judge complete discretion as to
what offenses can be deemed sexually violent, and therefore, satisfy, the
statute.107 Under statutes with this construction, there is no boundary to
safeguard which offenders immediately satisfy the first prong.108 Wide
discretion over the determination of prerequisite offenses, coupled with
the vague description of “mental abnormality,” raises the concern of
whether offenders’ liberty interests are being adequately protected;
namely, they are not.

first degree, or an attempt to commit any of the preceding crimes, or child molestation
in the first, second, third, or fourth degree, sexual abuse, sexual abuse in the first
degree, rape in the second degree, sexual assault, sexual assault in the first degree,
sodomy in the second degree, deviate sexual assault, deviate sexual assault in the first
degree, or the act of abuse of a child involving either sexual contact, a prohibited
sexual act, sexual abuse, or sexual exploitation of a minor, or any felony offense that
contains elements substantially similar to the offenses listed above.
Id.; see also CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6600(b) (West 2010); VA. CODE ANN. § 37.2-900
(2008).
103. MO. REV. STAT. § 632.480(4).
104. Id.
105. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02(e) (2013).
106. Id. at § 59-29a02(e)(13).
107. N.J. STAT. § 30:4-27.26 (2008).
(a) aggravated sexual assault; sexual assault; aggravated criminal sexual contact;
kidnapping pursuant to subparagraph (b) of paragraph (2) of subsection c. of
N.J.S.2C:13-1; criminal sexual contact; felony murder pursuant to paragraph (3) of
N.J.S.2C:11-3 if the underlying crime is sexual assault; an attempt to commit any of
these enumerated offenses; or a criminal offense with substantially the same elements
as any offense enumerated above, entered or imposed under the laws of the United
States, this State or another state; or
(b) any offense for which the court makes a specific finding on the record that, based
on the circumstances of the case, the person’s offense
should be considered a sexually violent offense.
Id.; see also S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-48-30(2)(o) (2015).
108. Wangenheim, supra note 81, at 584.
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2. Mental Abnormality Requirement
Sex offender civil commitment procedures use general, i.e. for
reasons other than sex offenses, civil commitment as guidelines, but
provide less constitutional protection because of a lack of specificity. To
commit a defendant to an institution instead of prison, there must be a
showing that “the person sought to be committed is mentally ill . . . [and]
the person requires hospitalization for his or her own safety and for the
protection of others.”109 As soon as the mental illness is no longer present,
the person must be released, regardless of how dangerous he continues to
be.110 The crucial disparity between general civil commitments and their
sex offender counterparts is that while general commitments require a
mental illness, sex offender commitments only require a mental
abnormality.111
a.

“Diagnosing” a mental abnormality

Mental abnormality, as it relates to SVPAs, is defined as a
“congenital or acquired condition affecting the emotional or volitional
capacity which predisposes the person to commit sexually violent offenses
in a degree constituting such a person a menace to the health and safety of
others.”112 The law relies on psychiatry’s ever-broadening categorization
of mental disorders in its requirement of “mental abnormality.”113 The
most common qualifying mental abnormalities are mood disorders,
personality disorders, and paraphilias.114 With the expansive list of
disorders available, the law is essentially able to cherry pick a “disorder”
to apply when it is deemed to be in the public interest.115 It has been
proposed that courts may purposefully decline to define disorders that
qualify under the statute in order for it to be applicable in as many
circumstances as possible.116 This is yet further evidence of the increased
stigma placed on sex offenders.
b.

Implication of socially taboo, but not dangerous, sexual interests

When the Supreme Court ruled the term “mental abnormality” was
not unconstitutionally vague,117 it “open[ed] the door to the acceptance of

109. Fabien, Kansas v. Hendricks, Crane and Beyond, supra note 91, at 1376.
110. Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 74 (1992).
111. Id.; Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 351 (1997).
112. KAN. STAT. ANN §59-29a02(b) (2012).
113. Hamilton, supra note 14, at 546.
114. Fabien, Kansas v. Hendricks, Crane and Beyond, supra note 91, at 1379.
115. Hamilton, supra note 14, at 546; Steven K. Erickson, The Myth of Mental Disorder:
Transsubstantive Behavior and Taxometric Psychiatry, 41 AKRON L. REV. 67, 114 (2008).
116. Hamilton, supra note 14, at 552.
117. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 351 (1997).
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other paraphilias as qualifying diagnoses.”118 Paraphilias, or abnormal
sexual interests, are a point of contention between the medical and legal
field.119 Paraphilias are defined as “any intense and persistent sexual
interest other than sexual interest in genital stimulation or preparatory
fondling with phenotypically normal, physically mature, consenting
human partners.”120 Critics view the mental abnormality requirement as
far-reaching because paraphilias are only included on the basis of societal
taboo, not because they are an actual disease of the mind.121 In fact,
abnormal sexual interests are not always dangerous, nor do they
necessarily pose risks to society, and the law generally only addresses
them when they are coupled with a crime.122 Divergent sexual interests
that would qualify as a paraphilia in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual
of Mental Disorders123 are not as anomalous in society as one might think.
A survey of men aged forty to seventy-nine found “sixty-two percent
reported some degree of sexual arousal from at least one paraphilia-related
stimulus while forty-four percent had engaged in at least one paraphiliarelated sexual behavior.”124
The inclusion of paraphilias based more strongly on societal than
medical reasons carries legal implications, since the law takes its cue from
the medical categorization.125 The largest category of mental abnormality
relied on to commit offenders is an unspecified paraphilic disorder,
meaning that their diagnosis resembles paraphilias but doesn’t match a
118. Hamilton, supra note 14, at 553.
119. First, supra note 22, at 191.
120. DSM-5, supra note 22, at 685. Most diagnoses fall under the “Other Specific
Paraphilic Disorder” or “Unspecified Paraphilic Disorder” category; however, eight of the most
common paraphilias include:
voyeuristic disorder (spying on others in private activities), exhibitionistic disorder
(exposing the genitals), frotteuristic disorder (touching or rubbing against a
nonconsenting individual), sexual masochism disorder (undergoing humiliation,
bondage, or suffering), sexual sadism disorder (inflicting humiliation, bondage, or
suffering), pedophilic disorder (sexual focus on children), fetishistic disorder (using
nonliving objects or having a highly specific focus on nongenital body parts), and
transvestic disorder (engaging in sexually arousing cross-dressing).
Id.
121. Erickson, supra note 115, at 114.
122. Hamilton, supra note 14, at 560.
123. DSM-5, supra note 22, at xli. The DSM is a comprehensive list of all mental
disorders published by the American Psychiatric Association to aid clinicians in classifying and
treating patients. Id.; John Matthew Fabian, Paraphilias and Predators: The Ethical
Application of Psychiatric Diagnoses in Partisan Sexually Violent Predator Civil Commitment
Proceedings, 11 J. FORENSIC PSYCHOL. PRAC. 82, 83 (2011) (“The classification of a syndrome
as a mental disorder in the [DSM-V] must be regarded as the primary standard for medical
validity.”).
124. Christopher Joseph Ahlers et al., How Unusual are the Contents of Paraphilias?
Paraphilia-Associated Sexual Arousal Patterns in a Community-Based Sample of Men, 8 J.
SEXUAL MED. 1362, 1366–69 (2011).
125. Hamilton, supra note 14, at 555.
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listed category.126 The civil commitment laws operate on a slippery slope
by satisfying the mental disease element with a paraphilia or unspecified
paraphilic diagnosis as they do not convey much information on the future
dangerousness of the offender.127
3. Commitment Models
Although the language of each state’s act is largely the same, there
are slight differences.128 For example, Illinois and Minnesota solve the
double jeopardy and ex post facto concerns by having a sexually violent
predator hearing before beginning the offender’s prison sentence for the
purpose of either sending the offender to prison or having him civilly
committed if he qualifies as a sexually violent predator.129 Although this
does not resolve the issue of indefinite commitment terms, it does ensure
offenders are not punished twice. This model of commitment implies the
legislature acknowledges civil commitment as akin to punishment.
The post-prison commitment model,130 represented in Washington
and the majority of states’ acts, present more constitutional challenges
than the Illinois model does because it duplicates the effects of previous
prison punishment, despite the Supreme Court ruling on the issue.131 In
Kansas v. Hendricks, the Supreme Court held the Kansas Sexually Violent
Predator Act was not unconstitutional in regard to double jeopardy and ex
post facto protections.132 If Hendricks had been committed prior to
serving his prison sentence, the state would not be required to release him
from commitment after a period equal to the prison sentence, but instead
could hold him for any period that he continues to suffer from a mental
abnormality that poses a threat to the public.133 Likewise, the Court
reasoned that a state can commit an offender after completion of a prison
sentence if he meets the qualifications, because he would have had no right
to be released even if committed initially.134
126. Id. at 554. The category is applied when “the clinician chooses not to specify the
reason that the criteria are not met for a specific paraphilic disorder, and includes presentations
in which there is insufficient information to make a more specific diagnosis.” DSM-5, supra
note 22, at 705 (emphasis added).
127. Hamilton, supra note 14, at 555.
128. Wangenheim, supra note 81, at 571.
129. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. §§ 205/0.01–205/12 (2014); MINN. STAT. § 253B.185
(2014). See infra Part II.B.
130. Wangenheim, supra note 81, at 572. The post-prison model of civil commitment
adjudicates the offender as a Sexually Violent Predator after having served a prison sentence
for the same prerequisite crime. Six to twelve months before release from prison a prosecutor
can move for a probable cause hearing to begin the process of commitment. Id.
131. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 351 (1997).
132. Id. at 369–70.
133. Id.
134. Id.
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If “mental abnormality” was not vague enough, under SVPAs, the
abnormality must also render it “difficult for the person to control his
behavior.”135 The Court uses this qualification to justify the future
dangerousness component usually necessary to restrain a person.136 The
Supreme Court held that there only needs to be “serious difficulty” in
controlling behavior and not a higher standard of a complete lack of
control as a subsequent ruling in Kansas v. Crane contends.137 The more
SVPAs come under litigation, the more broadly the Court defines the
standard.138
II. RIGHTS AFFORDED TO THE COMMITTED
The Due Process Clause protects the liberty interests of individuals
as a fundamental right, one that cannot be easily taken away. 139 However,
civil commitment are constitutionally permissible because the Supreme
Court has ruled their potential dangerousness coupled with a lack of
behavioral control is so great as to warrant that loss of liberty.140 The key
component to this exception is the “mental illness” or “mental
abnormality” requirement.141 Mental abnormality, and its effect on an
offender’s ability to control his behavior, is what legislatures use to
separate sexually violent predators from “typical recidivists.”142
The Supreme Court ruled that the civilly committed only hold
constitutionally protected rights to “conditions of reasonable care and
safety, reasonably nonrestrictive confinement conditions, and such
training as may be required by these interests.”143 Additionally, the right
to treatment is clarified by adding that the Court “[has] never held that the
Constitution prevents a state from civilly detaining those for whom no
treatment is available.”144 Without a Supreme Court ruling, individual

135. Id. at 358.
136. Id. at 351.
137. Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 346, 413 (2002).
138. Id. (holding that there does not need to be complete lack of control, only serious
difficulty); Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 351 (holding that mental abnormality satisfies the mental
illness requirement although it is not a term used in the medical field).
139. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offence to
be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law.”).
140. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 357.
141. Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 74 (1992); Crane, 534 U.S. at 413.
142. Crane, 534 U.S. at 413 (“[T]he nature of the psychiatric diagnosis, and the severity
of the mental abnormality itself, must be sufficient to distinguish the dangerous sexual offender
whose serious mental illness, abnormality, or disorder subjects him to civil commitment from
the dangerous but typical recidivist convicted in an ordinary criminal case.”).
143. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 324 (1982).
144. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 366.
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states are left to determine what services should be provided, resulting in
inconsistencies and lack of services.145 This section will first discuss
inconsistencies and lack of services between states, and next will highlight
the low rate of release that has the practical consequence of transforming
the constitutional indefinite detention into lifetime detention.146 And this
indefinite detention has survived constitutional challenges because it is
not governed with the protections afforded to criminal procedures, such
as double jeopardy, ex post facto, and due process.147
A.

No Constitutional Right to Treatment

Inconsistencies in treatment state-by-state exist because the Supreme
Court established that those committed have no rights to receive
treatment, and the authority is left to the individual states to choose
whether to they wish to provide any treatment.148 Sexually violent
predators experience a starkly different type of civil commitment
depending on whether they are committed in Washington or in
Minnesota.149 The Washington and Minnesota statutes have withheld
challenges to their respective civil commitment provisions,
notwithstanding the statutes’ drastically different standards with regard to
an offender’s right to receive treatment while committed, with all other
jurisdictions following treatment standards somewhere in between.150
Commitment standards in the Ninth Circuit, which includes Washington,
require treatment that will provide the offender with a “realistic
opportunity to be cured and released.”151 In contrast, the treatment
provided by facilities in the Eighth Circuit, including Minnesota, merely
have to refrain from being “so arbitrary or egregious as to shock the
conscience.”152
1. Shocks the Conscience Standard
The Eighth Circuit has not expanded the Supreme Court’s
requirements; it has held that those committed do not have “a broader due

145. Annual Survey of Sex Offender Civil Commitment Programs 2014, SEX OFFENDER
CIVIL COMMITMENT PROGRAMS NETWORK (Oct. 27, 2014). In a study of seventeen of the
states with civil commitment programs, the levels of participation in treatment programs ranged
from thirty-percent to one-hundred percent. Id.
146. Hamilton, supra note 14, at 552. The specific statutes for commitment vary between
jurisdictions. Id.
147. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 371.
148. Id. at 366.
149. Compare Strutton v. Meade, 668 F.3d 549, 554 (8th Cir. 2012), with Sharp v.
Weston, 233 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir. 2000).
150. Strutton, 668 F.3d at 554; Sharp, 233 F.3d at 1172.
151. Sharp, 233 F.3d at 1172.
152. Strutton, 668 F.3d at 554.
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process right to appropriate or effective or reasonable treatment of the
illness or disability that triggered the patient’s involuntary
confinement.”153 Facilities in the Eighth Circuit will release a patient
when they no longer have a mental abnormality or pose a danger to the
public;154 however, without the existence of rehabilitative services or the
requirement that detainees participate, the provision of release may be
meaningless.
The Eighth Circuit has evaluated due process claims under a “shocks
the conscience” test.155 When a civilly committed person asserts he has
not been provided with adequate mental health services, he must show
“the inadequacies in the treatment [he] received were so arbitrary or
egregious as to shock the conscience.”156 The Court even admitted that
although the “temporary elimination of psychoeducational courses . . . fell
below an acceptable professional standard,” it did not defeat the test and
therefore the claim was denied.157 Unfortunately, even if the Court
applied the “professional judgment” standard used by other jurisdictions,
the result in Strutton may have remained the same.158
2. Professional Judgment Standard
The Supreme Court applies the professional judgment standard,
which is an alternative standard for determining what treatment is owed
to the offenders.159 This preferred standard “presumes that the treatment
decisions of a qualified mental health professional are valid unless they
substantially depart from generally accepted norms.”160 Courts apply this
standard by analyzing the treatment a facility provides: if the treatment
resembles what is commonly acceptable in the field, then it passes the test
and the courts will not get involved with the choices of the facility. 161
Problems currently arise from the application of the professional judgment
standard, however, because there is no generally accepted treatment in the
field for sexually violent predators.162 Some professionals have posited
153. Elizabeth M. v. Montenez, 458 F.3d 779, 788 (8th Cir. 2006).
154. MO. REV. STAT. § 632.495(2) (2010 & Supp. 2014). Under the Missouri statute, a
sexually violent predator can be committed “for control, care, and treatment until such time as
[his] mental abnormality has so changed that [he] is safe to be at large.” Id.
155. Strutton, 668 F.3d at 554.
156. Id. at 554 (holding lack of psychoeducational treatment did not violate the rights of
someone involuntarily committed for child molestation).
157. Id. at 554–55.
158. Nordsieck, supra note 30, at 1284.
159. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 323 n.30 (1982).
160. Nordsieck, supra note 30, at 1284. The only qualifications for making the decisions
of treatment are that the decision-maker is “competent, whether by education, training or
experience, to make the particular decision at issue.” Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 323 n.30.
161. Nordsieck, supra note 30, at 1298.
162. Id.
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that sex offenders may not be treatable at all, since, as of now, there is no
scientific evidence showing any specific treatment plan can be
effective.163 The Association for the Treatment of Sexual Abusers itself
provides unclear advice on how to rehabilitate sex offenders.164 The
Association proffers treatment suggestions, but at the same time caveats
those suggestions by advising professionals to depart from the suggestions
as they see fit.165 If the standard of care states a professional can depart
from common treatments when they determine it to be appropriate, then
the standard becomes wholly based on whatever approach a professional
decides, without any regard to the rest of the field.
The Ninth Circuit also uses the professional judgment standard, but
accompanies it with a judicial scrutiny provision.166 This Note will refer
to the Ninth Circuit’s variation on the professional judgment standard as
the “professional judgment plus” standard. The Ninth Circuit criticized
the professional judgment standard because it allowed administrators of
each facility too much latitude in the individual decision-making
procedures.167 In response to the defendants’ appellate claim that the
lower court should have deferred to the clinical director’s professional
judgment, the court warned that if they were to overrule the lower court’s
decision, the “[c]onditions of confinement would be above judicial
scrutiny and would depend on who happened to be in charge of a particular
program.”168 For example, in Sharp, when there were no clinical directors
with specialized sex offender experience, the court did not rule that
general mental health professional decisions qualified under the
standard.169 The court made an important distinction here that narrows the
scope of acceptable treatment.
Commitment centers in the Ninth Circuit must “provide civillycommitted persons with access to mental health treatment that gives them
a realistic opportunity to be cured and released.”170 The professional
judgment plus standard is in contrast to the standards of the Eighth Circuit
because it seems to be aimed at rehabilitation, rather than an indefinite

163. Id.
164. Id.
165.
Research, THE ASS’N FOR THE TREATMENT OF SEXUAL ABUSERS,
http://www.atsa.com/research [https://perma.cc/2TH9-27UG] (“ATSA encourages those
involved in addressing the problem of sexual offending to adopt practices consistent with the
best available evidence, and to change their practices as new evidence becomes available.”).
166. Sharp v. Weston, 233 F.3d 1166, 1169 (9th Cir. 2000).
167. Id. at 1171. In previous court rulings, the Washington Special Commitment Center
was under an injunction to put specific treatment programs in place after the court found the
conditions of confinement were not unconstitutional. Id.
168. Id. at 1169.
169. Id. at 1171.
170. Id. at 1172.
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sentence with the empty promise of being released.171 While this standard
identifies the state’s obligation to provide an avenue for release if the state
chooses to commit, its goal is nevertheless hindered by the obstacle of
limited knowledge of the root cause.
B.

Absence of Criminal Protections in Civil Commitment Proceedings

The Supreme Court ruled that there are no double jeopardy, ex post
facto, or Fifth Amendment protections during civil commitment
procedures due to its civil versus criminal designation.172 Criminal
enforcement is punitive in nature whereas civil enforcement is not. The
Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides that an
individual cannot be charged twice for the same offense.173 There is no
double jeopardy issue present in civil commitment hearings because the
offender is technically not being charged twice for the same crime, as civil
commitment does not qualify as criminal punishment.174 Another
constitutional protection, ex post facto, broadly refers to the concept of
retroactivity, specifically, whether new laws have the ability to change the
penalties for a certain offense after they are committed.175 Furthermore,
individuals who committed a sex offense prior to the establishment of an
SVPA are also subject to civil commitment because the statute is civil and
therefore not imposing a new criminal punishment after the fact.176 “[T]he
Court essentially paved the way for the commitment of sexually violent
predators both in lieu of and subsequent to completions of a criminal
sentence.”177
In Allen v. Illinois, the Court stated that Allen did not have a Fifth
Amendment protection against self-incrimination during the sexually
violent predator hearing because it was not a criminal proceeding.178 A
potential predator is required by the court to submit to psychological
evaluations where they may reveal incriminating statements that can be
171. Strutton v. Meade, 668 F.3d 549, 554 (8th Cir. 2012) (stating that there were no
violations in treatment procedures when procedures did not meet field standards).
172. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 371 (1997); Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 374
(1986); Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966) (holding there was no double jeopardy issue
when Baxstrom already served prison sentence for same crime when he was committed); see
also Eli M. Rollman, “Mental Illness”: A Sexually Violent Predator Is Punished Twice For One
Crime, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 985 (1998).
173. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offence to
be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.”).
174. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 369.
175. See Evan C. Zoldan, The Civil Ex Post Facto Clause, 2015 WIS. L. REV. 727, 730
(2015).
176. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 371.
177. Deborah L Morris, Constitutional Implications of the Involuntary Commitment of
Sexually Violent Predators—A Due Process Analysis, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 594, 601 (1997).
178. Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 374 (1986).
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used in court. Allen was awarded a right to counsel during the proceeding;
however, allowing the “right to counsel,” which is a characteristic right of
a criminal proceeding, did not mean that he was afforded other
constitutional rights inherent in criminal proceedings.179 The dissent in
Allen held the proceedings should be considered criminal because they
involve a loss of liberty and bear procedural similarities to criminal
proceedings, and, therefore, Allen also should be awarded additional
constitutional protections.180
Justice Breyer commented in the Hendricks dissent that the civil
commitment scheme cannot be deemed civil merely by placing the word
“civil” in the statute, and instead needs to be analyzed according to its
practical effect.181 If those committed are not receiving effective
treatment for their purported mental defects, then their detainment seems
more akin to punishment and should be scrutinized as such. By removing
the guise of rehabilitation, the proposed reasoning for committing this
class of sex offenders is diminished and the serious implications of pure
incapacitation should be re-evaluated.182
III. COMMUNITY RESTRICTIONS WOULD SERVE THE STATE’S INTEREST
IN PROTECTING THE PUBLIC
To address these constitutional concerns surrounding civil
commitment, offenders should be placed under supervised release instead
of in commitment facilities. Although offenders would continue to be
heavily monitored in the community, they would not be confined. Rather
than persisting in the expensive, constitutionally dubious civil
commitment regime, states should rely on the already existing supervisory
structures created. The Adam Walsh Act created a comprehensive system
of sex offender management with strict and specific provisions that, in

179. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987) (holding that pretrial detention
for dangerousness does not violate Fifth Amendment due process rights). The standard for
dangerousness applied in Salerno was that “no condition or combination of conditions of release
[would] ensure the safety of . . . the community.” Id.
180. Allen, 478 U.S. at 376–84. The dissent noted that the Sexually Violent Predator
hearings only came into effect because of the crime Allen previously committed, and that the
hearings would not have taken place if he had not committed the crime. Id. at 379. The
requirement of a crime and the criminal nature of the proceedings, including confining someone
based on a criminal behavior, should qualify SVP statutes as criminal. Id.
181. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 381. Justice Breyer concurred with the majority’s
determination that the “mental abnormality” language of the statute did not violate the Due
Process Clause, but dissented in the opinion because without access to treatment, the statute was
punitive in nature. Id. at 373.
182. See Edward P. Ra, The Civil Confinement of Sexual Predators: A Delicate Balance,
22 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 335, 350 (2007) (“States thus must prove their civil intent
in order to defeat challenges rooted in the constitutional protections implicated by criminal
processes and punishments.”).
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addition to individual state community supervision structures, provide
assurance that the public will be protected.183 The government would also
see a cost benefit from changing methods of supervision since the
financial burden of civil commitment is so heavy.184 The solution this
Note proposes will address the financial criticisms of civil commitment in
addition to offenders’ constitutional rights to liberty.185 These methods,
while still costly, would reduce the expenditure for sex offender
supervision, serve the government’s goals in protecting the public, and
return some of the constitutionally-mandated liberty back to sex offenders.
A.

SORNA: Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act

The Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (“SORNA”)
created a national registry for sex offenders, categorizing them into tiers
based on the seriousness of the offense.186 Any person convicted of a sex
offense must register himself with the database and provide all identifying
information, updating his profile periodically according to his tier
group.187 The least dangerous offenders are in Tier I, escalating in
dangerousness to Tier III, which includes those convicted of “aggravated
sexual abuse, sexual abuse, abusive sexual contact against a minor under
thirteen, or nonparent kidnapping of a minor.”188 Registration as a Tier
III sex offender is required for life,189 which is most likely where current
183. Adam Walsh Act, 18 U.S.C. § 4248 (2006).
184. See ZILNEY & ZILNEY, supra note 42, at 141. The cost of housing one offender in
a civil commitment facility ranges from $17,391 in Texas to $166,000 in California, usually
depending on what services the facility offers. Id.
185. Douglas G. Smith, The Constitutionality of Civil Commitment and the Requirement
of Adequate Treatment, 49 BOS. C. L. REV. 1383, 1427 (2008). Critics of civil commitment
have suggested imposing longer prison sentences on sex offenders as a solution to the concern
that the government is spending too much money on having sexually violent predators
“warehoused” in civil commitment facilities. Id. The argument is that since offenders are
neither being treated for their mental abnormality nor being released in any significant number,
it is not an efficient use of the government’s limited budget. Id. at 1427. The average cost per
year for civilly committing a sexually violent predator is $92,017. ZILNEY & ZILNEY, supra
note 42, at 141. In contrast, the average cost per year to house an offender in prison is $25,994.
Id.
186. Adam Walsh Act, PUB. L. NO. 109–248, § 103, 120 Stat. 587, 587 (2006) (codified
as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 4248). SORNA sets the minimum amount of information and
protections that states must adhere to, but the states are permitted to add to the SORNA
requirements. SORNA, supra note 70. The Office of Sex Offender Sentencing, Monitoring,
Apprehending, Registering, and Tracking [hereinafter SMART] was created with the Adam
Walsh Act to assist states in their implementation of the Act and update the SORNA guidelines
as needed. Id.
187. Adam Walsh Act, § 113. Convicted persons must provide basic personal and
criminal information along with their physical description, Internet identifiers, professional
licensing information, temporary lodging information if they are not living at their listed
permanent residence, and vehicle information. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
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adjudicated sexually violent predators would fall. Tier III offenders are
required to update law enforcement every three months with their current
address and appearance.190
SORNA created a monitoring system for sex offenders living in the
community, which this Note contends would also be effective for sexually
violent predators living in the same communities because of the strict
nature of the Tier III regulations. SORNA is retroactive, meaning the
offenders who were convicted before 2006 also must register.191 The
retroactivity is crucial to ensuring the intended goal of the statute—to
protect the public—is carried out, because it will force every sex offender
to register.192 Because retroactivity makes it possible to reach every sex
offender, the offenders in civil commitments would be equally and safely
monitored by SORNA. The Adam Walsh Act also increased the amount
of publically available information about the offender.193 States can
monitor offenders with more confidence now that there is an expansive
database that includes sex offenders nationwide, and which prevents
offenders from going unaccounted for.194
1. Residency Restrictions
Nearly all states have enacted residency restrictions for sex offenders
as a means of protecting the public.195 Residency restrictions are also a
product of the 1990 crackdown on sex offenders, following the theme of
registration and notification laws.196 A key goal for regulating where sex
offenders live is to decrease the availability of victims.197 This goal is
190. Id.
191. 28 C.F.R. § 72 (2010). An interim rule was put in place, and subsequently codified,
to enforce the retroactivity of SORNA since the Adam Walsh Act as enacted did not specifically
provide for a retroactive application. 72 FED. REG. 8894 (2007); 28 C.F.R. § 72 (2010).
192. 28 C.F.R. § 72 (2010).
[T]he interests opposing and supporting registration—any adverse effect or burden of
SORNA’s requirements on sex offenders weighed against the public safety interests
furthered by those requirements—are much the same whether the class of sex
offenders with pre-SORNA convictions or the class of sex offenders with postSORNA convictions is considered.
Id.
193. See Registry Requirement FAQs, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS: SMART,
http://www.smart.gov/sorna htm [https://perma.cc/3MRK-AJY8]. The public website for sex
offenders lists all past sex offenses, their employer’s address, their school address, all aliases,
current photos, a physical description, their permanent and habitual addresses, and vehicle
identifying information. Id.
194. Wright, supra note 36.
195. Corey Rayburn Yung, Banishment by a Thousand Laws: Residency Restrictions on
Sex Offenders, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 101, 122 (2007) [hereinafter Yung, Banishment by a
Thousand Laws]. There are numerous problems and critiques of sex offender residency
restrictions, but these are outside the scope of this Note.
196. Id. at 121.
197. Id. at 154.
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accomplished by setting mandatory living distances from child-related
sites, for example, schools, playgrounds, and child care centers.198 In
essence, sex offenders are banned from potential child contact. In states
that have not mandated any state-wide restrictions, some localities have
established their own residency restrictions.199
Treatment and other rehabilitative services may be more difficult to
access due to the community priority of residency restrictions.200
Residency restrictions result in “hotbeds” of sex offenders living in certain
areas of cities because they are the only part of the city that successfully
evades all exclusion zones.201 Critics of residency restrictions stress the
problems with this approach, since it reinforces the sex offender stigma
without providing a long-term solution.202 Forced to live in remote areas
with like-minded individuals, offenders do not have access to treatment or
other resources.203 There is a valid concern that the restrictions placed on
sex offenders in the community are too inhibitory and further limit access
to treatment because individuals’ liberties are being taken away without
any benefit.204 However, at the same time, this critique exemplifies the
fact that sex offenders in the community are still heavily monitored and
the public’s interest in protecting children is still being met, while giving
more liberty to offenders than is given in civil commitments. Offenders’
access to treatment in the community is hindered by their living
constraints, and their access to treatment in commitments is likewise
hindered by their lack of a statutory right to receive it, both of which are
irrelevant since there are no effective treatments.205 Nonetheless, if
offenders are not receiving treatment in either setting and the public’s
interest in safety is being served by residency restrictions, then there is no
benefit in committing offenders who could live in the community.
Therefore, diverting offenders from commitments and into community
supervision would more aptly balance the two interests at stake.
2. Internet and Computer Restrictions
The growing use of technology, and specifically the Internet, has
opened the door for new types of crimes to be committed by sex offenders,
198. See generally FLA. STAT. § 794.065 (2015); GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-15 (2015); 720
ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-9.3(b-5) (2014); IND. CODE § 35-42-4-11(c) (2015); IOWA CODE §
692A.2A (2014).
199. Yung, Banishment by a Thousand Laws, supra note 195, at 125.
200. Shelley Ross Saxer, Banishment of Sex Offenders: Liberty, Protectionism, Justice,
and Alternatives, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 1397, 1411 (2009).
201. Yung, Banishment by a Thousand Laws, supra note 195, at 139–40.
202. Id. at 141.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. See supra Part II.A.1.
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and consequently, increased types of restrictions. Internet and computer
restrictions for released sex offenders have been used to monitor those
convicted of sex crimes related to the Internet, such as child
pornography.206 Federal and state laws restrict offenders in varying
degrees: some offenders are not allowed to even own a personal computer,
while others are only restricted from accessing certain websites.207 Many
jurisdictions allow the use of these types of restrictions because there is a
substantial and justifiable relationship between the government interest
that is being protected and the restriction (i.e. limited internet or computer
use) employed.208
The state must balance the interests of the released offender with the
interests of the government.209 Courts are cautious to impose computer
restrictions, since they acknowledge computer and Internet access has
become a fundamental aspect of life in current society, and therefore, a
protected liberty.210 However, when someone is on supervised release,
there is a “diminished expectation of privacy,” and consequently,
liberty.211 The government cannot deprive released offenders of their
liberty in using the Internet if the deprivation does not relate to protecting
the public, namely, if the offense has little to do with the Internet. Rather,
the restriction must be “reasonably related” to the governmental interest
being furthered.212
Internet restrictions for those offenders who are now placed in civil
commitments would be an effective means of monitoring them while, at
the same time, increasing liberty in a way that better balances the
competing interests of the state and the offender. The state’s interest in
protecting the public would be served because courts will impose
restrictions that are “narrowly tailored and directly related to the social
policies of deterring [the released offender] from committing sexual
crimes and also protecting society.”213 The degree of restrictions courts
currently use would be well-suited for those previously adjudicated as
206. Krista L. Blaisdell, Protecting the Playground of the Twenty-First Century:
Analyzing Computer and Internet Restrictions for Internet Sex Offenders, 43 VAL. U. L. REV.
1155, 1158 (2009).
207. Id. at 1170.
208. United States v. Lifshitz, 369 F.3d 173, 192–93 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding there is a
government interest in restricting the Internet use of sex offenders).
209. Blaisdell, supra note 206, at 1186.
210. United States v. Crandon, 173 F.3d 122, 128 (3d Cir. 1999) (acknowledging access
to computers may hinder job opportunities where the Internet has become an essential tool).
211. United States v. Balon, 384 F.3d 38, 44 (2d Cir. 2004) (comparing the diminished
privacy for supervised release to the diminished privacy expected in the prison setting).
212. United States v. Rearden, 349 F.3d 608, 621 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding restricting
computer and Internet use is “reasonably related” to the goal of protecting the public from an
Internet sex offender).
213. Blaisdell, supra note 206, at 1175.
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sexually violent predators, since they have discretion as to how lenient or
strict they need to be in restricting access.214 If a court decides that
completely barring all access to a computer is necessary to prevent a
previous sexually violent predator from reoffending, it can impose such a
restriction upon release.215 Even the harshest level of Internet and
computer restriction is preferable to civil commitment, and results in a
better balance of the two interests at issue.
3. Electronic Monitoring
The Jessica Lunsford Act mandated lifetime electronic surveillance
post-release for those convicted of sexually assaulting a child under
twelve.216 Over twenty other states have also adopted this provision.217
Global Positioning System (“GPS”) monitoring provides another method
for law enforcement and community corrections to protect the public from
released offenders.218 GPS can be implemented in a variety of ways,
modified according to the particular circumstances of each released
offender.219 Active GPS monitoring allows for law enforcement or
community corrections to know exactly where an offender is in near-real
time.220 Electronic surveillance is commonly used when the court imposes
house arrest, triggering an alert if the offender steps outside a preset
radius.221
Electronic surveillance can be costly, due to direct equipment cost
and labor costs of those personnel who are in charge of the monitoring the
offenders. However, the cost of electronic surveillance is far less than the
cost of placing the same offender in civil commitment.222 Additionally it
would allow the offender to maintain his own residence and become
rehabilitated.223 Offenders with GPS monitors are frequently given prior
approval to leave at certain times for therapeutic treatments, such as
counseling or group meetings.224 This flexibility would allow offenders
currently classified as sexually violent predators access to beneficial
214. Id. at 1170.
215. United States v. Paul, 274 F.3d 155, 167 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding the state had the
authority to restrict all computer and Internet use).
216. FLA. STAT. § 948.30 (2016). See supra Part I.A.1.d.
217. ZILNEY & ZILNEY, supra note 42, at 90.
218. Matthew Demichele & Brian K. Payne, GPS Tracking and the Law Enforcement
Role, 82 POLICE J. 134, 134 (2009).
219. Id. at 136.
220. Id. at 137. There is a negligible delay in transmitting the information from the
receiver. Id.
221. Demichele, supra note 218, at 137.
222. Id.
223. Id. Under house arrest, offenders could reunite with their families and “avoid the
negative consequences associated with incarceration.” Id.
224. Id.
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activities, such as therapy, since in some states they would be offered that
assistance in the commitment setting.
IV. SUGGESTED STATUTORY REFORM FOR ADJUDICATING FEWER
SEXUALLY VIOLENT PREDATORS
“To broaden this definition further would be to perpetrate an ongoing
stereotype based in social hysteria rather than legitimate state
interest.”225

Rerouting sex offenders, who would currently be adjudicated as
sexually violent predators, from civil commitment placements into
community supervision placements would not be a simple task. This Note
proposes the statutory language in the Sexually Violent Predator Acts be
reformed to allow for fewer sex offenders to be placed in civil
commitments. In particular, the current definition of a sexually violent
predator is “any person who has been convicted of or charged with a
sexually violent offense and who suffers from a mental abnormality or
personality disorder which makes the person more likely to engage in the
predatory acts of sexual violence.”226 The ambiguity in this definition is
problematic and must be altered.
A.

Offense Requirement

The offense requirement in the Sexually Violent Predator Acts is the
first step in an offender’s consideration for civil commitment, and
therefore is the first opportunity for a statutory reform to eliminate
offenders who are not implicated in the legislative purpose of the
SVPAs.227 The acts are meant to only impact those offenders who commit
a violent sex offense,228 which is why the offense limitation in the acts is
crucial. Currently, some states have wide discretion written into their

225. Wangenheim, supra note 81, at 570.
226. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02 (2015).
227. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 360 (1997). The Hendricks Court explains that
the civil commitment process is not meant for those offenders who “are perhaps more properly
dealt with exclusively through criminal proceedings.” Id.
228. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a01(a) (2015).
The legislature finds that there exists an extremely dangerous group of sexually
violent predators who have a mental abnormality or personality disorder and who are
likely to engage in repeat acts of sexual violence if not treated for their mental
abnormality or personality disorder. Because the existing civil commitment
procedures under [the general involuntary civil commitment statute] are inadequate
to address the special needs of sexually violent predators and the risks they present to
society, the legislature determines that a separate involuntary civil commitment
process for the potentially long-term control, care and treatment of sexually violent
predators is necessary.
Id.
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prerequisite offense sections, opening the door for societal opinion to
influence the decision-making process.229 Sex offenders are in particular
need of protection from the influence of public opinion on the legal
process because of the heightened negative sentiments toward sex
offenses.230 A bright line rule is necessary to distinguish which offenses
qualify and which do not in order to safeguard against any intentional
societal biases.
This Note proposes that all SVPAs must have limited discretionary
language in the prerequisite offense requirements, similar to the current
Missouri statute. The Missouri statute specifically enumerates the
offenses that qualify as:
[F]elonies of rape in the first degree, forcible rape, rape, statutory rape
in the first degree, sodomy in the first degree, forcible sodomy,
sodomy, statutory sodomy in the first degree, or an attempt to commit
any of the preceding crimes, or child molestation in the first, second,
third, or fourth degree, sexual abuse, sexual abuse in the first degree,
rape in the second degree, sexual assault, sexual assault in the first
degree, sodomy in the second degree, deviate sexual assault, deviate
sexual assault in the first degree, or the act of abuse of a child
involving either sexual contact, a prohibited sexual act, sexual abuse,
or sexual exploitation of a minor.231

The concluding provision adds to the definition “any offense that
contains elements substantially similar to the offenses listed above.”232
Although this provision does allow for some flexibility for which
offenses should be included, it is necessary to account for new or obscure
offenses that cannot presently be listed.233 The “substantially similar”
standard is adequate protection because it requires the prosecutor to show
an offender committed a sexually violent offense that has similar
characteristics to the already listed offenses.234 The underlying nature of
those enumerated offenses is still being used in determining the
applicability of an offense not listed, retaining the original goal as to
229. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02(e)(13) (2013) (“any offense which either at the time
of sentencing for the offense or subsequently during civil commitment proceedings pursuant to
this act, has been determined beyond a reasonable doubt to have been sexually motivated”); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 30:4-27.26 (2008) (“any offense for which the court makes a specific finding on
the record that, based on the circumstances of the case, the person’s offense should be
considered a sexually violent offense”); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-48-30(2)(o) (2015).
230. See supra Part I.A.
231. MO. REV. STAT. § 632.480(4) (2010 & Supp. 2014).
232. Id.
233. There is the potential for new crimes to be created due to a continuously changing
society, most notably in sex offenses that use technology. See Blaisdell, supra note 206, at
1208. Planning for the possibility of new crimes “prevents crafty criminals from identifying
and capitalizing on loopholes in the statutory text.” Id.
234. See id.
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whom the Acts should reach. There should be no other discretionary
provisions other than the “substantially similar” one listed above; if the
existence of a predicate sex offense cannot be proven under that high
standard, then the offense was not originally meant to be impacted by the
SVPAs, which were created to affect “a small but extremely dangerous
group of sexually violent predators [that] exist . . . .”235 In order to keep
this population “small,” a high standard is necessary.
B.

Mental Abnormality Requirement

Once the offense requirement is satisfied, the prosecutor must prove
the offender has a mental abnormality or personality disorder and prove
that the same mental abnormality or personality disorder makes it difficult
to control his behavior, and therefore he is likely to reoffend.236 Because
there are multiple steps in this requirement and those steps involve the
medical profession, it is more complex and consequently at great risk for
error when applied in the courtroom.237
The language used in the SVPAs is a combination of both medical
and legal terms.238 Blending terms from these two distinct fields creates
a lack of clarity in standards. For instance, the mental abnormality
standard is not a medical or scientific one; it is a product of the legal
field.239 Mental abnormality in the SVPAs is defined as a “congenital or
acquired condition that affects the emotional or volitional capacity,
predisposing the person to commission of criminal sexual acts.”240 On
one hand, the Court in the seminal Hendricks case stated that “legal
definitions don’t need to mirror the medical profession,” while at the same
time the Court used medical professionals to clarify whether or not
Hendricks met the definition of a sexually violent predator.241

235. WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.010 (2014).
236. WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.030 (2014). The Washington statute is representative
of the majority of the states’ mental abnormality provisions.
237. Michael B. First & Robert Halon, Use of DSM Paraphilia Diagnoses in Sexually
Violent Predator Commitment Cases, 36 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 443, 444 (2012).
238. John Matthew Fabian, The Risky Business of Conducting Risk Assessments for
Those Already Civilly Committed as Sexually Violent Predators, 32 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 81,
93–94 (2005). The author presents a few cases, including Hendricks and Crane, to illustrate the
“psycho-legal issues pertaining to the definitions of mental abnormality, volition, emotional
abnormality, and personality disorder [because they] are quite vague and often lead to serious
confusion.” Id. at 93.
239. The term “Mental Abnormality” is not used by the medical community; instead, it
is a specialized term created by legislatures for mental health concepts. Kansas v. Hendricks,
521 U.S. 346, 359 (1997). Legislators wanted to broaden the scope beyond a strict “mental
illness” diagnosis so the acts would include offenders who could not otherwise be reached by
the general civil commitment statute. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a01(a) (2013).
240. WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.030 (2014).
241. First & Halon, supra note 237 (citing Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 359).
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A medical standard should be in place throughout the entire civil
commitment process in order to reduce confusion and misapplication, in
addition to greater specificity in terminology. Medical experts are
ordinarily brought in during a civil commitment proceeding to testify
about the offender’s mental condition.242 Applying medical opinion based
on medical standards to a legal standard does not provide the bright-line
clarity that SVPAs should require as a safeguard against societal stigmas
entering the courtroom.243
Rather than applying the medical testimonial evidence to the current
legal standard, the triers of fact should base their determination on the
medical reasoning the professional used in making his diagnosis. Both
the legal and the medical decision makers would thus view the evidence
from the same perspective.
Using a medical framework throughout the legal process would also
afford more standardization later, when the court reviews the offender for
release.244 The court will release an offender from civil commitment upon
the showing that his “mental abnormality has so changed that [he] is safe
to be at large.”245 Medical professionals, usually from the civil
commitment facility where the offender resides, provide their opinion to
the court as to whether the offender still has the same mental abnormality
that initially required his commitment.246 Legal standards are slower to
evolve than scientific understanding, and therefore may often not be as
up-to-date and accurate as medical knowledge.247 It is critical that
determinations in sexually violent predator cases be based on the most
accurate information available because of the deprivation of liberty that is
involved.
In order for the trier of fact in SVPA trials to make an informed
decision from medical testimony, the court needs to provide a clear

242. Fabien, Kansas v. Hendricks, Crane and Beyond, supra note 123, at 91. The expert
can discuss the different aspects of the offender’s condition, then the jury decides whether those
aspects could satisfy the mental abnormality element. Id.
243. See First & Halon, supra note 237, at 444 (explaining the vital importance of the
medical experts’ testimony due to the “complications and subtleties involved in integrating
clinical diagnostic information with the kinds of dysfunction required by the statutes”).
244. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a08–11(a) (2013). An offender must be released if at any
point during his confinement he no longer satisfies the statutory requirements. Id.
245. MO. REV. STAT. § 632.495(2) (2010 & Supp. 2014).
246. Joan Comparet-Cassani, A Primer on the Civil Trial of a Sexually Violent Predator,
37 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1057, 1100 (2000).
247. Risk Assessment, supra note 85. Courts rely on clinicians for their opinion on the
level of “risk” or “dangerousness” that a sex offender presents. Id. Although there remains a
great amount of uncertainty in the accuracy of risk assessment, research in the past decade has
significantly increased that accuracy. Id. Research focused on particular sex offender types has
shown improved accuracy by tailoring the risk assessment to the characteristics of the offender,
as opposed to lumping all types of sex offenders together. Id.
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understanding of the elements that must be satisfied. This is best
accomplished through precise language in the statutes themselves and
through the organized presentation of the medical evidence. The current
SVPAs combine multiple critical elements into one section, which results
in misapplication and confusion of the separate elements.248 The
perspective of the legislators who created the SVPAs was that the mental
abnormality in question caused a lack of control and therefore was the
reason for a high risk of recidivism, as well as the fact that the prerequisite
violent sex offense was a product of that mental abnormality. However,
those distinct relationships become confused.249 Courts in a variety of
cases use differing language in analysis of the SVPA, revealing
inconsistencies in standards and in results.250
CONCLUSION
Currently over five-thousand offenders are committed throughout the
United States,251 and most will never be released,252 despite the provision
that they will only be held as long as their mental abnormality persists.
Because the standard is broad, more sex offenders are in commitments
than actually need to be for various reasons. Offenders could be
committed for “suffering” from a negligible paraphilia that a physician
and judge deemed to pass the mental abnormality standard,253 or they
could be committed because the judge used his discretion in deciding that
their offense should be considered a sexually violent offense.254
Through the expansion of the “sexually violent predator” definition,
states are further strengthening public fear by creating a category, and thus
a perception, that applies to a wider range of offenders than was originally
intended. The public will infer that since more offenders are being sent to
civil commitments, their prevalence must be increasing. That is untrue,
and a myth that the judicial system should not be promoting.
The government’s legitimate interest in protecting the public from

248. First & Halon, supra note 237, at 444. The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders lists the indicators of paraphilias and distinguished them from paraphilic
disorders. DSM-5, supra note 22, at 685–86. A paraphilia is defined as “any intense and
persistent sexual interest other than sexual interest in genital stimulation or preparatory fondling
with phenotypically normal, physically mature, consenting human partners.” Id. at 685.
Whereas a paraphilic disorder is defined as “a paraphilia that is currently causing distress or
impairment to the individual or a paraphilia whose satisfaction has entailed personal harm, or
risk of harm, to others.” Id. at 685–86.
249. First & Halon, supra note 237.
250. Comparet-Cassani, supra note 246.
251. ZILNEY & ZILNEY, supra note 42, at 143.
252. Hamilton, supra note 14.
253. Ahlers et al., supra note 124, at 1366–69.
254. N.J. STAT. § 30:4-27.26(b) (2008).
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the dangers of sex offenders and the sex offenders’ liberty interests are not
being any better served in the civil commitment process than they would
be if those designated as sexually violent predators lived in the community
under the same restrictions as other sex offenders. The standard for
adjudicating someone a “sexually violent predator” under state and federal
statutes should be narrowed to include specified mental diseases and
specified prerequisite offenses, removing vague language and broad
discretionary authority. Narrowing the scope of the statutes will return
fundamental rights to a portion of sex offenders whom the statutes were
not originally intended to affect.

